Causation, measurement relevance and no-conspiracy in EPR by San Pedro, Iñaki
Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices and the





An influential argument against Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common
Cause (RPCC), first proposed by Elliott Sober (1987, 2001), consists on an
example which involves correlations between bread prices in Britain and sea
levels in Venice. The following quotation summarises the spirit of the whole
argument:
Because both quantities have increased steadily with time, it is
true that higher than average sea levels tend to be associated
with higher than average bread prices. [. . . ] we do not feel
driven to explain this correlation by postulating a common cause.
Rather, we regard Venetian sea levels and British bread prices as
both increasing for endogenous reasons. [. . . ] Here, postulating
a common cause is simply not very plausible, given the rest of
what we believe. (Sober, 2001, p. 332)
There have been different attempts to deal with examples of the kind of
Sober’s ‘Venetian sea levels and British bread prices’. It is striking though
that none of these make use of recent development as regards the formal
structure of the probability spaces where the relevant events, corresponding
correlations and potential common causes that might be involved in a causal
explanation of such correlations are defined precisely. I refer, in particular,
to the results by Hofer-Szabo´ et al regarding the existence of screening-off
events for any correlation:
[. . . ] every classical probability space (S, µ) is common cause
completable with respect to any finite set of correlations [. . . ]
given any finite set of correlations in a classical event structure,
one can always say that the correlations are due to some common
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causes, possibly ‘hidden’ ones, i.e. ones that are not part of the
initial set S of events. (Hofer-Szabo´ et al, 1999, p. 378)
Both quotations above seem to contain opposite claims and thus appear
to convey two quite incompatible views. The aim of this paper is to put
this two views into perspective and look at each of them in the light of the
other. In particular, I shall investigate, in the light of the formal results by
Hofer-Szabo´ et al, to what extent examples of the kind of Sober’s constitute
a thread to RPCC. This, in turn, shall provide a good analysis of the actual
(physical) significance and range of applicability of the so-called extendability
and common cause completability theorems. As a result, I will conclude that
the two quotations above are to be taken to complement each other rather
than as reflecting opposite incompatibles views.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides the mains of a
formal approach to the main ideas behind RPCC, along with the main issues
regarding its significance and philosophical status. Section 3 introduces the
ideas of extendability and common cause completability. In Sections 4 and 5
I review Sober’s argument against RPCC and discuss on what grounds it
may be taken as a potential thread to the principle. Two recent reactions to
Sober’s example are reviewed here as well. Finally, I suggest in Sections 6
and 7 two alternative solutions to save RPCC from criticisms of the kind of
Sober’s. The paper closes with some concluding remarks.
2 Reichenbachian Common Causes
The idea of common cause goes back to Reichenbach and has its origins at
the observation of apparently unrelated events that nonetheless take place
simultaneously with a certain regularity:1
If an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a
common cause.
One way to proceed is to translate Reichenbach’s original intuitions into
a formal language so that the concept of common cause can be analysed in
detail within the framework of classical probability theory.2 The notion of
correlation is central, as it is assumed to capture Reichenbach’s intuitions
regarding improbable coincidences. Let us then define correlation as follows:3
1Cf. (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 157).
2I follow here the work by Hofer-Szabo´ et al in the late 1990’s and early 2000.
See (Hofer-Szabo´ et al, 1999, 2000a,b) and (Re´dei, 2002) for the main results of the pro-
gram. We need to be aware that this ‘formalisation’ will only approximately capture some
of the subtleties in Reichenbach’s original intuitions. The whole program hinges however
on the assumption that it is possible for the formal results achieved to be translated back
into claims about the actual physical systems involved, and in particular into causal claims
3This definition is of positive correlation. A completely symmetrical definition may be
given for negative correlations. Distinguishing between positive and negative correlations
will not be important in what follows and positive correlations will thus be assumed.
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Definition 1. Let (S, p) be a classical probability measure space with Boolean
algebra S representing the set of random events and with the probability mea-
sure p defined on S. If A, B ∈ S are such that
p(A ∧B)− p(A) · p(B) > 0, (1)
then the events A and B are said to be (positively) correlated, and we write
Corrp(A,B).
A Reichenbachian common cause is then defined as:
Definition 2 (Reichenbachian Common Cause). An event C is said to be a
Reichenbachian common cause if the following independent conditions hold:
p(A ∧B|C) = p(A|C) · p(B|C) (2)
p(A ∧B|¬C) = p(A|¬C) · p(B|¬C) (3)
p(A|C) > p(A|¬C) (4)
p(B|C) > p(B|¬C), (5)
where p(A|B) = p(A ∧ B)/p(B) denotes the probability of A conditional on
B and it is assumed that none of the probabilities p(X) (X = A,B,C,¬C)
is equal to zero.
With both the notions of correlation and Reichenbachian common cause
above at hand Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) may
be stated as follows:
Definition 3 (RPCC). For any two (positively) correlated event types A
and B (Corrp(A,B) > 0), if A is not a cause of B and neither B is a cause
of A, there exists a Reichenbachian common cause C of A and B, i.e. there
exist an common cause event C such that it satisfies conditions (2)-(5).
The definition above consists of two distinct independent claims. The
first is a claim at the ontological level, regarding the existence of common
causes, and the other at the methodological level which provides a concrete
characterisation (through equations (2)-(5)) of the prior postulated common
causes.
A proper distinction of these two claims is crucial for the assessment of
the status of RPCC. In particular, since each of the two claims in RPCC is
logically independent of the other, arguments aimed at criticising the charac-
terisation of common causes through expressions (2)-(5) may very well leave
untouched the metaphysical existential claim about common causes. In fact,
while it is part of the received view that equations (2)-(5) do not constitute
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for common causes, there have
been prominent defenders of common cause explanation —or alternatively
of some version of the Principle of the Common Cause— provided the notion
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of common cause is characterised in an appropriate manner.4 On the other
hand, arguments devised to deny the very existence of common causes may
be completely compatible with the claim that, whenever they exist, common
causes are to satisfy equations (2)-(5).
Despite the controversies, endorsing RPCC may be motivated by at least
two reasons. First, note that for Reichenbach the role of the principle as a
whole, and of the screening-off condition in particular, is mainly explanatory.
Reichenbach explicitly points out that the four statistical relations explain
the correlations between A and B in two senses. First, he notes that the four
relations entail that A and B are (positively) correlated, i.e. Corr(A,B) >
0. On the other hand, a common cause C satisfying these four relations
explains the correlation by rendering A and B statistically independent.5
The explanatory power of screening-off common causes by itself may thus
be taken as a good reason to support RPCC.
Second, recent results show that, at least formally and under some qual-
ifications, it is always possible to provide a Reichenbachian common cause
(as defined above) for any given correlation.6 These results build on the
intuition that any probability space S which contains a set of correlations
and which does not include (Reichenbachian) common causes of these, may
be extended in such a way that the new probability space S ′ does include
(Reichenbachian) common causes for each of the original correlations. These
intuitions are formalised in so-called extendability and common cause com-
pletability theorems.
3 Common Cause Completability
It is not difficult to think of examples of probability spaces containing cor-
related events which do not feature however any event that conforms to the
definition of Reichenbachian common cause. We shall call such probability
spaces Reichenbachian common cause incomplete spaces.7
We seem to have two alternatives when dealing with Reichenbachian
common cause incomplete probability spaces. Either we go for a weakening
of the common cause criterion —this is for instance the case in both Salmon’s
‘interactive forks’ and Cartwright’s generalisation of the fork criterion—,
or we may simply embark on the search for screening-off common causes,
hoping that such events exist but have remained somehow ‘hidden’ to us all
along. Here I shall only pay attention to the second alternative. So how
4Salmon (1984) and Cartwright (1987) advance perhaps the most influential proposals
for a generalisation of Reichenbach’s original criterion for common causes.
5Cf. (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 159).
6See (Hofer-Szabo´ et al, 1999, 2000b,a) for details.
7Reichenbachian common cause incomplete probability spaces are very common and,
in fact, most examples aimed to rule out screening-off as a necessary condition for common
causes exploit such incompleteness.
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should this search be undertaken?
Note first that we need to be searching new events (i.e. the Reichenba-
chian common causes) which are not contained in the original (incomplete)
probability space (S, p). Intuitively, we need some notion of extension than
could be applied to our probability space. This is formally achieved as fol-
lows:8
Definition 4 (Extension). The probability space (S ′, p′) is called an exten-
sion of (S, p) if there exist a Boolean algebra embedding h of S into S ′ such
that p(X) = p′(h(X)), for all X ∈ S.
Extendability allows then for the enlargement of the original probability
space so that new events are included.
In a second step, we should be able to set up a procedure to enlarge our
common cause incomplete probability space such that the new extended
probability space contains common causes for the original correlations.9
This intuition is formalised through the idea of Reichenbachian common
cause completability:
Definition 5 (RCC Completability). Let Corr(Ai, Bi) > 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
be a set of correlations in (S, p) such that none of them possess a common
cause in (S, p). The probability space (S, p) is called Reichenbachian com-
mon cause completable with respect to the set Corr(Ai, Bi) if there exists
an extension (S ′, p′) of (S, p) such that Corr(Ai, Bi) has a Reichenbachian
common cause Ci in (S
′, p′) for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Completability is hence the key for successfully searching Reichenbachian
common causes.
The question is now whether any incomplete probability space (S, p)
can be extended such that it is turned into (Reichenbachian) common cause
complete. We may ask, in other words, when is a probability space (S, p)
Reichenbachian common cause completable?
Hofer-Szabo´ et al answer this question with the following proposition:10
Proposition 1. Every classical probability space (S, p) is common cause
completable with respect to any finite set of correlated events.
The proposition shows that given a Reichenbachian common cause in-
complete probability space an extension (S ′, p′) may always be performed
such that it contains (Reichenbachian) common causes for all the original
correlations.
8Cf. (Hofer-Szabo´ et al, 2000a).
9Definition 4 ensures that the extension operation be consistent with the old event
structure (S, p). In particular, the embedding h is defined such that correlations stay in-
variant under the extension operation, that is Corr(A,B) ≡ Corrp(A,B) ≡ Corrp′(A,B).
See (Hofer-Szabo´ et al, 2000a) for details.
10Cf. (Hofer-Szabo´ et al, 1999, p. 384).
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Common cause completability hence constitutes a very powerful tool if
we are to provide common cause explanations of generic correlations. It
nevertheless faces its own problems, especially when it comes to the phys-
ical interpretation of either the enlarged probability space S ′ or the new
common causes contained in it. In particular, it seems a fair criticism to
the whole program to claim that common cause completability is merely a
formal device, which is likely to lack physical meaning in many (perhaps
too many) cases. I shall retake the issue later on and just point out for now
that such criticisms may be successfully addressed.11 On the other hand,
the program hinges on two implicit assumptions which are far from uncon-
troversial. Namely, the assumption that common causes exist of any given
correlation (except for those that result from direct causal influence), i.e. the
metaphysical part of RPCC is assumed to be correct; and the assumption
that such common causes are to be characterised by equations (2)-(5). Un-
der these assumptions, and setting the issue of interpretability aside for now,
common cause completability seems powerful enough a tool as to provide
good methodological grounds in support of RPCC.
4 Venetian Sea Levels and British Bread Prices
Examples such as Sober’s ‘Venetian Sea Levels and British Bread Prices’
(VSL & BBP) are devised to refute RCCP by criticising the metaphysi-
cal content of it. Sober however draws methodological consequences from
the conceptual possibility (rather than the real existence) of correlations —
e.g. between sea levels in Venice and bread prices in Britain— which cannot
be accounted for in terms of common causes. (This, he argues, favours the
use of the Likelihood Principle instead of RPCC). Although the intuitions
behind Sober’s argument are in my view quite strong, the argument seems
to be at odds with the results we just discussed concerning common cause
completability. I shall thus try to clarify in what follows whether there is
such an incompatibility really. Let us first start with the details of Sober’s
example itself.
It is the case that the sea level in Venice (VSL) and the cost of bread in
Britain (BBP) have been (monotonically) increasing during a given period
of time. Table 1 displays the values of Venetian sea levels and British bread
prices in accordance with Sober’s actual example.
From the data displayed, we are told that ‘higher than average values’
of Venetian sea levels and those of British bread prices are correlated:12
11I point the reader to (San Pedro and Sua´rez, 2009) for a recent assessment of the
significance of common cause completability, possible criticisms to it and possible strategies
to avoid these.
12Cf. (Sober, 2001, p. 334). The appeal to ‘higher than average values’ rather than just
‘values’ is mainly motivated by criticism to an earlier version of the counterexample (Sober,
1987). There is no need to review such arguments here since they will not play any
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Venetian Sea Levels and British Bread Prices
Year (i) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 〈Year〉 = 4.5
VSL 22 23 24 25 28 29 30 31 〈VSL〉 = 26.5
BBP 4 5 6 10 14 15 19 20 〈BBP〉 = 11.625
Table 1: Sober’s Venetian sea levels and British bread prices data (Sober,
2001, p. 334).
As I claimed initially, higher than average bread prices are cor-
related with higher than average sea levels.
Let us denote the event ‘the Venetian sea level in year i is higher than
average’ by the expression ‘VSLi > 〈VSL〉’. (Similarly for bread prices in
Britain ‘BBPi > 〈BBP〉’).
What Sober seems to have in mind when claiming that ‘absolute values’
of VSL and BBP are correlated is the following. On the one hand, the
probability of observing a ‘higher than average’ Venetian sea level in year i
can be seen (directly from the data displayed in Table 1) to be
p (VSLi > 〈VLS〉) = 1/2.
Similarly, for British bread prices one has that
p (BBPi > 〈BBP〉) = 1/2.
On the other hand, one may also calculate the joint probability of both:
p [(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) ∧ (BBPi > 〈BBP〉)] = 1/2.
These three probabilities entail that:
p [(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) ∧ (BBPi > 〈BBP〉)]
−p (VSLi > 〈VLS〉) · p (BBPi > 〈BBP〉) > 0. (6)
Thus, the argument goes on, ‘higher than average values’ of Venetian
sea levels and British bread prices are in fact (positively) correlated.
The question is then how this correlation is to be explained away. Sober
points out that there are three possible ways to go:13
important role in the foregoing discussion. The important point is that Sober’s later
formulation stands. Sober also refers to ‘higher than average values’ as ‘absolute values’
and I shall use these two expressions indistinctly.
13These three possible explanations had been already suggested by Meek and Glymour
after Yule (1926). See also (Sober, 2001, p. 332) and references therein.
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(i) To postulate the existence of an unobserved common cause.
(ii) To claim that the data sample is unrepresentative.
(iii) To claim that the data arises from a mixing of populations with dif-
ferent causal structures and correspondingly different probability dis-
tributions.
Considering these three options in turn shows, according to Sober, that
RPCC fails. The argument is as follows. First, Sober dismisses option (ii)
by pointing out that the correlations in his example do not come out of an
unrepresentative sample since data could be spread over a larger period of
time and the correlations would still be there —I completely agree with this
and I will also dismiss option (ii) altogether. Second, option (i) is false in
the example ex hypothesis. Consequently, Sober takes option (iii) to provide
the right (causal) explanation of the correlation. This constitutes a failure
of RPCC.
5 Is VSL & BBP a Genuine Counterexample?
But does Sober’s VSL & BBP really constitute a genuine counterexample to
RPCC? In order to answer this particular question we need to address two
further questions, I think. First, we need to know whether the VSL & BBP
correlation is indeed genuine (as defined formally in Section 2). Second, in
case it is so, we need to ask why is it that there is no possible common
cause explanation of the VSL & BBP correlation. In other words, if the
counterexample is to stand, we need to make sure that no common cause at
all can be provided for the correlation. It is not enough to just assume this
ex-hypothesis, in my opinion. I will tackle these two questions in turn
Kevin Hoover and Daniel Steel have both recently tried to diffuse Sober’s
example at some level, each with quite different arguments and each reaching
different conclusions. The main issue these two reactions differ in is, in fact,
the answer to our first question, i.e. whether the VSL & BBP correlations
are indeed genuine correlations or mere associations of the sample.
As we have seen, the probabilities of ‘higher than average values’ of
Venetian sea levels and British bread prices display what seems to be a
probabilistic dependence —by means of expression (6) on page 7. However,
if we are to conclude that ‘higher than average values’ of sea levels and bread
prices are correlated, we need first make sure that the probabilities involved
refer to the same and only probability space.14 In other words we need to
check that ‘absolute values’ of sea levels and bread prices are events of the
very same probability space.
14This is explicitly required in the formal definition of correlation (Definition 1).
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But nothing in the data set tells us the probability measure should be
the same. In fact, the probabilities for each quantity are derived quite
independently (from the relative frequencies of the corresponding measured
sea levels and bread prices over a time span). Strictly speaking we should
perhaps have initially written them as p1(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) and p
2(BBPi >
〈BBP〉), i.e. as referring to two different probability measures p1 and p2.
Similarly for the joint probability we should perhaps have written it relative
to yet another probability measure, i.e.
p3 [(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) ∧ (BBPi > 〈BBP〉)] .
With this in mind, relation (6) should have been written:
p3 [(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) ∧ (BBPi > 〈BBP〉)]
−p1(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) · p
2(BBPi > 〈BBP〉) > 0. (7)
Now, the question whether the expression above reflects a correlation
between sea levels and bread prices may be restated in terms of these three
different probability measures, i.e. are p1, p2 and p3 in fact one and the same
probability measure?
The above is somehow related to Hoover’s arguments in reaction to the
VSL & BBP case.15 Hoover distinguishes correlations from mere associa-
tions of the sample. Very succinctly, while associations are a property of
the sample, correlations are a property of the probabilistic space used to
model it. Hoover assumes that it is only correlations that can reveal ‘real’
properties of the system. In our case then, if the probability measures p1, p2
and p3 would be different, expression (7) could only be said to reflect some
degree of association between sea levels and bread prices, but not a corre-
lation. In order for it to represent a correlation a consistent probabilistic
model —with a single probabilistic measure, that is— must be construed
such that the example’s data may be embedded in it. This is not the case
in Sober’s example, in Hoover’s view. He thus concludes that the VSL &
BBP scenario does not constitute a counterexample to the RPCC.
Hoover’s case might find support in Sober himself. For, as it is claimed in
the original argument, each data series belongs to different causal structures
—this was option (iii) in Sober’s argument. This can then be seen to suggest
that the two probability spaces need to be different. But is it right to claim
that the ‘Venice-Britain’ scenario cannot really be described in a whole single
probability space? Put it differently, why could it not be the case that data
in Table 1 give rise to genuine correlations? I think this is indeed an option.
In particular, while I share Hoover’s views as regards mere associations and
genuine correlations, I do not see why may not the data in Table 1 be




An argument along these lines is provided by Steel, who makes use of
a well known mathematical result, namely the ‘mixing theorem’.16 Very
briefly, the ‘mixing theorem’ provides us with information about the be-
haviour of a probability distribution resulting from the mixing of the distri-
butions from two populations, each of which with probabilistically indepen-
dent variables. The theorem tells us, in particular, under what conditions
the variables of such a ‘mixed’ probability distribution are probabilistically
independent. The theorem then shows that a probability distribution may
display dependencies just because it is the result of the mixing of two other
probability distributions. Steel claims this is the case in Sober’s ‘Venice-
Britain’ example, and constructs a model from two initial sets of data (of
both VSL and BBP), each corresponding to different (distant) time spans.
If the probability distributions from these two populations are mixed, the
resulting distribution displays probabilistic dependencies in just the manner
suggested by Sober.17 Summing up, I see no convincing reason why prob-
abilistic dependencies such as those in the ‘Venice-Britain’ example would
not be genuine correlations.
Once the question as to whether VSL & BBP are (genuinely) correlated
has been positively answered, we shall turn to our second question. Is it
really the case that no common cause explanation can be given of the cor-
relation between sea levels in Venice and bread prices in Britain?
In relation to this question, we seem to face three possible scenarios.
First, we may find out that it is certainly the case that no common cause
whatsoever can be provided that explains the correlation. In that case the
example would indeed constitute a genuine counterexample to RPCC. Al-
ternatively, and contrary to what Sober thinks, we might find out, with the
help of common cause completability for instance, that it is indeed possible
to provide a common cause explanation of the correlation. Finally, Sober’s
criticism could also be avoided if we could show the question to be non-
applicable. For example, even if we take the VSL & BBP correlation to be
genuine we might want to argue that it needs no causal explanation after
all, perhaps due to the fact that it does not reflect any feature of the sys-
tem itself. It seems to me that the first option —that is, conceding Sober’s
point— only makes sense once the other two have been ruled out. Let us
then consider the two last options in turn.
6 Screening-off Events Exist
Recall that, by common cause completability, an appropriate extension of
a common cause incomplete probability space guarantees that there exist a
screening-off event. For what it has been said up to now, there is no reason
16Cf. (Steel, 2003).
17See (Steel, 2003) and references therein for further details.
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why common cause completability should not also work in our case at hand.
Suppose for instance a new model —an appropriately extended proba-
bility space— contains events of the type ‘Yi > 〈Year〉’, which we may call,
following Sober’s terminology, ‘higher than average time values’, ‘higher
than average values of years’, or ‘absolute values of years’, never mind how
strange this may sound. We may then assign probabilities to such events
in exactly the same way as we did for ‘higher than average’ values of sea
levels and bread prices, that is by referring to their relative frequencies.
(Only, we need to make sure that the probability measure is the same for
all three values so as to make sure that resulting correlations are indeed
genuine correlations.) Thus, we may write, again from the data on Table 1,
p (Yi > 〈Year〉) = 1/2.
If we now take conditional probabilities we obtain, also looking at the
data in Table 1,
p (VSLi > 〈VSL〉 | Yi > 〈Year〉) = 1, (8)
p (BBPi > 〈BBP〉 | Yi > 〈Year〉) = 1. (9)
It is also easy to check that
p [(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) ∧ (BBPi > 〈BBP〉) | Yi > 〈Year〉] = 1. (10)
It is then clear that, as soon as we consider the event ‘Yi > 〈Year〉’, the
correlation will vanish. This is because the dependence of the original series
washes out conditional on ‘Yi > 〈Year〉’. In particular if we define a new
probability measure pY = p(· | Yi > 〈Year〉), the above equations yield
pY [(VSLi > 〈VSL〉) ∧ (BBPi > 〈BBP〉)]
− pY (VSLi > 〈VSL〉) · p
Y (BBPi > 〈BBP〉) = 0. (11)
This example is of course specific for the case at hand, and the ‘trick’ has
been quite the obvious one, since I transformed both the original data series
by describing them in the probability space in which all probabilities are one.
In this case the probability space with such ‘nice’ properties is particularly
easy (and obvious) to find since the time dependence of both sea levels
and bread prices’ higher than average values is exactly the same. However
obvious and specific this example might be, I hope it illustrates sufficiently
how screening-off events can be provided for such kind of correlations.
This is not quite a causal explanation yet, since the event ‘Yi > 〈Year〉’
does not seem capable of a causal interpretation in an obvious or straight-
forward way. The question is, more specifically, how can we make sense of
events ‘Yi > 〈Year〉’ as (common) causes. I must admit that I do not have
an answer to this question. For, in what relevant sense is time a causal
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factor in the VSL & BBP example? Indeed, I find it hard to understand
‘Yi > 〈Year〉’ as a cause event.
Of course, problematic issues of this kind will be present whenever a
time dependent event needs to be interpreted as a cause, but not only then.
In fact, the problem is more general and has to do with the actual sig-
nificance and applicability of the (formal) extendability and common cause
completability theorems. I haven mentioned already that it is in the spirit of
the whole program that the various claims resulting from the formal treat-
ment of the problem can be translated back into claims about the particular
physical systems involved, and more specifically into causal claims. In this
sense, common cause completability will not achieve its purpose unless we
are able to provide the formally obtained screening-off events with a phys-
ical interpretation which can be made to fit into a causal story. I see two
ways one can try to solve, or at least minimise, the difficulties with the
interpretation of such screening-off events. An obvious case for common
cause completability can be made if we recall that the extension of a com-
mon cause incomplete probability space is not unique. We may thus hope
(I think quite optimistically but nevertheless realistically) that among all
possible extensions of the original probability space, there must exist one
that contains a screening-off event which can be adequately interpreted as a
common cause. That is, a Reichenbachian common cause. In the particular
case above of time dependent events we may further hope, perhaps less real-
istically, that further conceptual innovations may at some stage provide an
adequate framework so as to be able to interpret them as (common) causes.
In sum, the example and the discussion above teach us something both
about Sober’s example and the actual significance of common cause com-
pletability. On the one hand, it seems that there are actually good method-
ological grounds to expect screening-off common causes to exist for any
given correlation, included those in the ‘Venice-Britain’ example. On the
other hand, we may quite possibly face problems with the interpretation of
the screening-off events obtained formally for such correlations. This, al-
though it is not enough, I think, to discard common cause completability as
a good methodological tool it gives an idea of its limitations and scope of
applicability.
7 Purely Formal Correlations
An alternative line of thought would be to deny that the physical significance
of the correlations we are trying to explain is at least dubious. This idea
would find support in the fact that the screening-off events we have obtained
by means of common cause completability are difficult, if not impossible, to
make sense physically. (Of course ‘optimistic’ defenders of common cause




Going back to our case, a more thorough analysis of the ‘absolute year
values’ events suggests that the VSL & BBP correlation arises solely due
to the time dependence shared by the two systems evolutions. Put it the
other way around, we may ask, more specifically, what does the correlation
between sea levels and bread prices really say, if anything at all, about the
level of the sea in Venice and the price of the bread in Britain?
A closer look to the very events we are dealing with, i.e. ‘higher than
average values’, reveals that these are defined relative to the average of the
corresponding quantity over a certain period of time. That is, the correlated
events in the ‘Venice-Britain’ example have some sort of time dependence.
Time dependent data is also known as non-stationary data. It is also
well known that non-stationary data display dependencies that do not always
reflect a system’s inner structure. For instance, it is a consequence of the
‘mixing theorem’ that two sets of non-stationary data display probabilistic
dependencies even if each of them refers to a completely different historical
period. Also as a consequence of the ‘mixing theorem’, if the probabilistic
dependence of two data series is due to them being non-stationary the corre-
lation will vanish as soon as we describe the data in a probabilistic model in
which one of them is no longer non-stationary. This is in fact what happens
with the VSL & BBP correlation, as we have seen in the model-example I
outlined in the previous section. We can then conclude that sea levels and
bread prices in the VSL & BBL case are only correlated in virtue of telling
us something about time, i.e. the correlation does not reflect any informa-
tion whatsoever about the underlying (physical) structure of the system (if
there is any system we can speak of).
The ‘Venice-Britain’ correlations then seem to be a case of what we
can call purely formal correlations, i.e. correlations that arise solely as a
product of formally modelling experimental data. This is very much along
the lines of the argument in Steel (2003). Steel concludes however that,
even though RPCC cannot be applied to non-stationary data series, Sober’s
example constitutes a genuine counterexample to it. For there is a genuine
correlation which, even if it is artificial (or ‘non-sense’), is not to be explained
in terms of a common cause. But, we may ask, should we really demand
a common cause explanation when faced with purely formal correlations?
We can go back to Reichenbach’s original intuitions in order to answer this
question.
As I said Reichenbach’s notion of ‘improbable coincidence’ is to be cap-
tured by the idea of correlation. But do all correlations stand for ‘improba-
ble coincidences’? Well, I don’t think so. In fact, purely formal correlations
such as those in the ‘Venice-Britain’ example do not seem ‘improbable’ in
any sense. Quite the contrary, the structure of the model formally entails
such coincidences. In this view then, correlations that arise purely formally
from the model structure would not be in need of causal explanation. Sober’s
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example therefore would not constitute a genuine counterexample to RPCC.
Finally, this conclusion may help demarcating further the range of appli-
cability and significance of the extendability and common cause completabil-
ity theorems. For, if a given correlation is of purely formal origin, and
reflect therefore no physical feature of the system in question, it would seem
quite unreasonable to expect it to be screened-off by a physically meaningful
event. I think that it is even quite legitimate to suggest that the physically
meaningless ‘time’ events in the previous section explain —although not
causally— the correlation, in the sense that it is precisely their lack of phys-
ical interpretation that indicates the (formal) character of the correlation.
In other words, the physical significance of the extendability and common
cause completability theorems depends crucially on the very nature of the
correlations considered as well.
This is also related to a possible objection to the whole argument. Namely,
the fact that although it is initially assumed that the events involved in the
‘Venice-Britain’ scenario, i.e. ‘higher than average’ events, are real physical
events, we have concluded that their correlations are just purely formal and
do not reflect in any way physical features of the system. Again, what this
objection points to is the limitations in the applicability of common cause
completability. Recall that Hofer-Szabo´ et al. conceive their formal theorems
as tool to effectively discover causal relations in the world. In this sense, the
assumption that the events and correlations in the original probability space
are real physical events is taken for granted, as it is assumed as well that
the result of applying common cause completability provides real screening-
off common causes. But we have seen this is not always the case. In fact
this later assumption may introduce the apparent contradiction raised by
in the objection above. An alternative answer to the objection would be to
note that Sober himself conceives the ‘Venice-Britain’ correlations as a con-
ceptual possibility, rather than as a real correlation in the physical world.
One could then follow Sober in this and apply common cause completability
bearing in mind that the screening-off events obtained in doing that will be
common causes, also taken as a conceptual possibility.
To conclude, the analysis above suggests that both solutions above may
be seen to conflate somehow. For, if common cause completability is applied
to the ‘Venice-Britain’ scenario we obtain physically meaningless screening-
off events. And this suggests that the ‘Venice-Britain’ correlation is just an
artificial one. Thus, whether ‘Venetian sea levels and British bread prices’
does constitute indeed a genuine counterexample to RPCC is just a matter of
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